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PERCEIVED PUNISHMENT AND REWARD VALUES ASSIGNED TO SUPERVISOR A--ETC(U)

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20. Abstract (contd)

Visibility appeared to be most strongly related to perceived severity. In contrast with suggestions in the literature (cf. Leon, 1981), substantial levels of agreement among raters were found for aversive as well as rewarding actions. Also reviewed are characteristics of leader actions that received mixed ratings from respondents.

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Perceived Punishment and Reward Values Assigned
to Supervisor Actions

There is mounting evidence that employees perform better and are more satisfied when successful performance leads to positively valued outcomes (Cherrington, Reitz, & Scott, 1971; Greene, 1973; Sims, 1980; Szilagyi, 1980). Consistent with such findings, considerable attention has been directed toward understanding the nature of positive outcomes (Arvey & Ivanevich, 1980). For example, Jurgenson (1978) asked more than 56,000 applicants contacted over a 30 year span to indicate their relative preference among a set of 10 positive outcomes. These outcomes included pay and benefits, security and advancement opportunities, working conditions, and the presence of good supervisors. While there were some differences between men and women (women ranked favorable work conditions more positively than did men) and across age groups (younger applicants placed greater emphasis on factors associated with current work conditions and less on long-term outcomes), the relative rankings assigned to the outcomes were remarkably stable. The median correlation reported across subsequent 5-year periods was .97 for men and .95 for women. Similarly, Lawler (1971) reviewed 49 studies that asked respondents to rank organizational incentives and found substantial agreement regarding the relative importance of pay. Thus, in spite of studies that report only moderate short-term reliabilities for specific ratings (e.g., DeLeo & Pritchard, 1974), the relative values attached to positive outcomes appear generally consistent across time and respondents.

Contingencies with negative outcomes have also been shown to influence

employee attitudes and behavior but the research is less consistent (León, 1980). Cherrington et al. (1971) found increased productivity on later trials if rewards were withheld from low performers on early trials. Keller and Szilagyi (1976) found that supervisory punishment behavior clarified effort-to-performance and performance-to-reward expectancies and led to reduced role ambiguity. These relationships were less strong than was found for reward, however. In a different vein, Szilagyi (1980) reported that punitive leader behavior was related to higher levels of employee performance, while Oldham (1976) noted that the use of personally punishing motivational strategies was negatively related to managerial effectiveness.

Arvey and Ivancevich (1980) suggested that much of this apparent contrast between the consistent effects of positive outcomes and the inconsistent effects of negative outcomes reflects the relative lack of effort to identify and understand negative outcomes. They argued that one of the most salient problems confronting the individual who wishes to study the effects of punishment in organizations is determining "what constitutes an aversive event or stimulus to employees" (p. 130). They suggested that managers have control over a wide range of potentially punishing stimuli that include not only formal and overt actions but also less overt actions such as assignment to undesirable jobs, subtle statements and ridicule. They noted the current lack of empirical evidence about how employees view potentially negative outcomes and called for studies specifically directed toward the identification of aversive events.

In one of the few studies to address relationships among positive and

negative outcomes, Reitz (1971) analyzed a 20-item Contingency Questionnaire that asked managers in a large financial institution to describe actions their supervisors would take in response to employee behaviors or performance levels. He found three underlying factors--Supportive Instrumentality which reflected punishment or reward-withholding responses, Punitive Instrumentality which reflected punishment or reward-withholding responses, and Advancement Instrumentality which reflected perceived differences in career advancement as a function of employee behavior. Sims and Szilagyi (1975) used a modified version of this instrument in a study of paramedical and medical support personnel and found two primary factors. One reflected general reward behaviors while the second reflected punishment.

Both studies, however, focused on supervisor behaviors that had been determined on an a priori basis to be rewarding or punishing. Further, many of the statements were very general (e.g., "Your supervisor would show a great deal of interest . . . ,", "Your supervisor would get on you if . . . ,", "Your supervisor would lend a sympathetic ear . . ."). Neither study provided information about relative values attached to the leader actions or insight into the characteristics that make such behaviors rewarding or punishing.

On the surface, the task of gaining such data is straightforward. However, valences may be attached to positive and negative outcomes somewhat differently. León (1981) argued that the inconsistent findings when negative outcomes are used to predict behavior occur because individuals process information about positive outcomes in a relatively

analytical fashion that considers the characteristics of these outcomes. Negative outcomes are treated less analytically, however, with the primary concern being the severity of the outcome. While such relatively crude use of information may or may not impair an individual's ability to provide valence ratings for negative outcomes, the logic, if correct, underscores the need to identify which outcomes are viewed as rewarding and which as punishing.

Unfortunately, many organizational outcomes may be viewed differently by different individuals. For example, Tornow (1971) noted that one employee might feel rewarded by an assignment to a challenging and demanding task while another might find the same assignment aversive because it is too demanding of time and effort. Thus, effective use of reward or punishment requires both not only awareness of outcomes viewed as rewarding or punishing by the majority of employees, but a clear understanding of outcomes that are likely to evoke substantial individual differences in the assignment of value.

The present study was intended to (a) identify the values that employees attach to a variety of supervisory actions that might be taken to punish or reward employee behavior or performance, (b) determine which actions were especially susceptible to individual differences in interpretation, and (c) explore possible characteristics that render an action rewarding or punishing.

Method

Sample

The sample consisted of 157 undergraduate students enrolled in industrial/organizational psychology courses at two major universities.

All respondents were currently employed, although 14% ($N = 22$) indicated part-time employment. The respondents had worked in their present positions from 1 month to 16 years ($\bar{X} = 1.73$ years, $S.D. = 2.27$). Jobs included clerical, (e.g., clerk-typist, secretary, accounting clerk), sales (e.g., retail sales, real estate), food service (e.g., waiter, hostess), unskilled (e.g., laborer, dishwasher) and skilled blue-collar (e.g., mechanic, cook), technical (e.g., laboratory technician, electronics repair), and administrative and lower level managerial positions (e.g., manager of retail store). There were approximately 20 respondents in each category with the exception of clerical ($N = 33$) and unskilled ($N = 13$) jobs. While sex of the respondents was not measured, the sample consisted of approximately equal numbers of males and females. All subjects responded voluntarily and anonymously.

Instruments

The punishment and reward values of various supervisory actions were measured by means of a Supervisor Reward/Punishment Questionnaire. This instrument presented 60 possible actions that a supervisor might take as an intentional reward or punishment response to subordinate behavior. Items were developed through interviews with employees and supervisors and from statements in the current literature (Arvey & Ivancevich, 1980; Kleeman, 1979; Oldham, 1976; Sims & Szilagyi, 1975).¹ Respondents were asked to indicate how rewarding or punishing they personally would find each action if it were performed by their current supervisor. Ratings were made on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = very punishing, 3 = neither rewarding or punishing, 5 = very rewarding).

Results

Reward/Punishment Values

To determine the punishment or reward value of the various actions, mean ratings were computed for each item (see Table 1). Based on the resulting mean scores, 31 actions were viewed as generally rewarding ($\bar{X} > 3.0$) while 29 were rated as generally punishing ($\bar{X} < 3.0$). For greater ease of interpretation, actions were ranked from most rewarding to most punishing and are presented in three categories: (a) actions assigned a score of 4 or 5 (i.e., rewarding) by at least two-thirds of the respondents; (b) actions that received less than two-thirds agreement about their reward or punishment value; and (c) actions that received a score of 1 or 2 (i.e., punishing) by at least two-thirds of the respondents.

Insert Table 1 about here

Actions which received the highest reward ratings seemed to possess certain important characteristics. Most evident was the quality of public display. For example, the public award of a plaque or a public compliment was rated more rewarding than privately awarded praise. A second characteristic seemed to be the degree to which the action involved long-term status improvement or formal organizational resources. Actions with long-term implications (e.g., pay raise or promotion, more authority to do the job, singled out as "heir apparent" for a prestigious job) generally received higher mean scores than actions with short-term implications (e.g., one-time cash award, supervisor buys lunch or coffee, gives up to an hour off). A third characteristic of actions viewed as most

rewarding seemed to be information that the individual was seen as knowledgeable, responsible and important to the organization. Thus, behaviors involving participation (e.g., asks for your opinion) as well as actions that acknowledged individual expertise (e.g., asks you to train newcomers, recommends special training) were rated as more rewarding than actions reflecting personal consideration or support (e.g., personally explains reasons for a request).

Possible characteristics that made an action more or less punishing were harder to identify, however. While some public actions (e.g., fines, public criticism) were rated as strongly negative, others with apparently similar levels of visibility (e.g., visibly checks on your work) or potential long-term implications (e.g., takes away some of your duties) received less severe appraisals. Thus, in contrast with positively evaluated actions, there were no evident trends in ratings about the relative severity of punishment.

A final area of interest in the data presented in Table 1 concerns actions where there were substantial individual differences in assigning reward or punishment values. For the present study, such items were considered to be those which received similar ratings by fewer than two-thirds of the respondents. Consistent with earlier findings (Tornow, 1971), many of these items reflected actions that might be viewed as affecting job demands and challenge.

Factor Analyses

To investigate more systematically the questions of possible dimensions that were related to the reward or punishment value assigned

to the various actions, the items were factor analyzed. Items within each of the three categories presented in Table 1 were analyzed separately because (a) of the possibility that dimensions are assigned differently to positively and negatively valued actions, and (b) to increase the subject/item ratio.

Reward actions. A principal components analysis of the 25 items categorized as rewarding produced eight components with eigenvalues ≥ 1.0 . While these eight accounted for 61.5% of the item variance, following varimax rotation only four possessed loadings $\geq .40$ by more than two variables. Thus, the more parsimonious, four-factor solution is presented in Table 2.

Insert Table 2 about here

The four factors appeared generally consistent with the earlier discussion about the characteristics that differentiated among higher versus lower reward values. For example, the first factor appeared to reflect "Implied Respect and Esteem" with high loadings by actions involving participation (allows you to participate in decisions) support (personally explains the reasons for a request) and general indications of valued expertise (asks you to train newcomers). The second factor was labelled "Tangibility" because it possessed high loadings by actions that were likely to produce clear outcomes. The third factor consisted primarily of actions that were short-term in their implications or were under the direct but informal control of the supervisor (one-time cash award, an hour off, assignment of

desirable jobs). This factor appeared very similar to Oldham's (1976) concept of a "Personally Rewarding" motivational strategy. The fourth factor was labelled "Visibility" because it contained high loadings by actions that involved public recognition. With the exception of the "Personnally Rewarding" factor, there appeared to be few differences in the average reward value of the actions comprising the different factors. This factor, however, consisted of actions that were generally viewed as less rewarding than those loading on the other three.

Insert Table 3 about here

Punishing actions. Analyses of the actions viewed as negative produced seven components with eigenvalues ≥ 1.0 (58.4% of trace). Similar to the analysis of reward actions, however, only four possessed loadings $\geq .40$ after rotation (see Table 3). The first seemed to represent a variety of actions, characterized primarily by the fact that they were informal and possessed minimal long-term consequences. This factor seemed to represent a concept similar to Oldham's (1976) "Personally Punishing" motivational strategy. The second factor --"Formal and Tangible Punishment"-- seemed to reflect actions that were more formal and possessed potential long-term consequences. The two factors did not seem to differ, however, in regard to severity of punishment insofar as the median ratings of actions loading on each was the same. The third factor--"Visibility" was generally viewed as the most severe (i.e., lowest median ratings) and reflected a public display character similar to that found for reward. The fourth factor reflected actions that tended to isolate the individual from important information or resources. This factor was labelled "Gatekeeping."

Actions receiving mixed ratings. As in the previous analyses, only four of the factors found for the actions receiving mixed ratings possessed loadings $\geq .40$ by more than two items (five factors had eigenvalues ≥ 1.0 , 56.2% of trace). These are shown in Table 4. The first factor clearly reflected an element of "Job Demands/Challenge" with loadings by a number of actions that required above average application of effort or skill. The second factor was less clear in its meaning but seemed to reflect actions that demonstrated the imposition of "Supervisory Control and Dominance" over the individual. The actions on this dimension generally received the most negative ratings. The third factor--"Negative Reinforcement" reflected a general withholding of recognition or reward rather than direct aversive actions. Further, the general tone of these items suggested that the ambivalent ratings might reflect differences in whether or not the supervisor was seen as withholding deserved recognition. The final factor was the only one which consisted of generally positive items. This factor seemed to reflect the degree to which the supervisor would permit the individual to engage in behaviors that were technically inappropriate. The factor was thus labelled "Tolerance."

Insert Table 4 about here

Differences due to Occupation and Tenure

Potential differences in the way that individuals evaluated supervisor actions because of differences in tenure and occupation were also assessed. Influences related to tenure were determined by correlating the number of months in the position with the value assigned to each

action. Few systematic relationships were found; of the 60 correlations, only three were significant: Listens carefully to what you have to say ($r(155) = .25, p \leq .01$); increases job responsibility although there was no increase in pay ($r(155) = .19, p \leq .05$); and publicly acknowledges your contribution to his or her success. Differences related to occupational category were also few. Only one item yielded significant differences. Thus, within the present sample, tenure and occupational type did not appear to be major influences on the values attached to supervisor actions.

Discussion

The present study was designed to explore subordinate perceptions of a variety of specific supervisor actions that might be used to encourage an employee to continue in a certain course of behavior or to alter behavior to a more organizationally desirable pattern. The ratings obtained in this study suggested that employees indeed view such actions as rewarding and/or punishing. Further, there was general agreement on the appropriate connotation for most of these actions in spite of differences in respondent occupations and the amount of time the person had spent in a particular position.

More important than the relative values attached to specific actions, however, was the question about general characteristics that might cause an action to be viewed as more or less rewarding or more or less punishing. This question was most directly addressed by the results of the principal components analyses. Rewarding actions especially seemed to possess certain key attributes. For example, the actions that were labelled most

rewarding seemed to possess one or more of the following: (a) public visibility; (b) long-term implications; (c) tangible or objective outcomes; and (d) implications about the individual's worth to the organization. Further, the data appeared to corroborate statements that pay and other positive organizational outcomes derive considerable reward value because of inherent "merit badge" qualities (Steers & Porter, 1979). Actions that involved only the immediate supervisor or short-term consequences were viewed as less rewarding than actions that involved long-term organizational commitments.

These statements do not mean that the supervisor must commit to extensive outlays of time or money before an action is viewed as rewarding. Indeed, most of the actions contained in the present study appeared to avoid the problems of high cost and complexity typically encountered in formal pay incentive programs (cf. Lawler, 1971). While recommendations of a pay increase clearly carried the highest reward value, other less costly or less involved actions also received high reward valences. Among them were public awards of a plaque or certificate, telling the superior about good performance, introductions to visiting dignitaries, and other such actions that are easy and inexpensive to dispense. Further, few of these rewards appeared to be devalued as a function of tenure. Rather, there was a very slight tendency for some of them (e.g., those involving participation) to become more positively valued the longer a person had been in the position. The specific reasons for such a relationship were not addressed, but it is likely that the implications such actions have for self-worth become stronger through time as the individual feels that his/her expertise is greater and more valuable to the organization. Thus,

supervisor actions which provide visible evidence that the organization approves of and values the employee's actions and which convey long-term positive consequences are likely to be viewed as rewards by employees in a wide range of occupations and tenure groups.

The present findings also suggested certain characteristics that might cause an action to be viewed as more or less punishing. In many ways, the dimensions derived from analyses of punishing actions appeared very similar though opposite in direction to those derived from actions seen as rewarding. For example, the characteristics of public display, formal vs. informal consequences and long-term implications were also evidenced by the components produced in the analysis of punishing actions. A review of the ratings assigned to the items within each component, however, suggested that public visibility was perhaps more influential than the other characteristics in determining the perceived severity of the action. In part, this emphasis on public visibility may reflect the basic nature of many of the actions viewed as negative. For example, actions viewed as rewarding generally described a definite event or some tangible outcome. Punishing actions, however, often reflected the withholding of positive outcomes rather than direct actions or identifiable events. In these actions, the effect is negative but the act is one of omission rather than commission. Further, for such actions to be clearly identified as punishing, there must be some sense that the outcome would otherwise be available to the individual. Thus, public visibility may add an element of tangibility to the punishing action and help to focus on a specific episode or action as negative.

León (1981) noted that, in contrast with expectations about positive outcomes, the expectancies associated with negative outcomes seldom produce significant predictions of employee behavior. He suggested that much of the fault lies in inconsistent valences attached to negative outcomes. The present study suggests, however, that individuals attach valences to many negative outcomes as clearly and with as much agreement as they do with traditionally positive outcomes. Thus, differences in the consistency of positive versus negative valences may not adequately explain the lack of behavioral prediction for the latter. The present data suggest at least two additional possibilities. First, many of the actions rated punishing may be committed inadvertantly or as unintentional consequences of positive actions. For example, the supervisor who praises several members of a workgroup may unintentionally punish persons not mentioned. A supervisor who in times of stress or pressure turns to the most competent and experienced subordinates may unintentionally punish these persons by allowing others to remain idle. Likewise, a supervisor might postpone actions on employee requests to attend to task-related or management priorities. The ensuing delay may not affect the final action on the request, but might cause the employee to view the handling of the request as punishing thus superseding an outcome viewed as rewarding. Problems with inadvertant punishment are further compounded by the fact that employees tend to overestimate their own performance and to see themselves as above average even when they are average or below by objective standards (Meyer, 1975). Thus, the individual who receives an average performance assessment may feel punished because of a belief that a higher rating was deserved.

A second possible influence is perceived intent. Positive actions

such as praise, pay raises, awards, and so forth usually convey clear meaning that it is desirable for the employee and for others who observe the supervisor's action to repeat a specific form of behavior (Lawler, 1971). For formal negative actions as well, both the intent and the employee behavior that triggered it are generally made explicit and clear by the formal process. For many other actions, however, the punishing effect may be evident but the intent and the triggering behavior are obscured. Especially actions which involve negative reinforcement convey primarily information that the employee's actions have not produced a reward or achieved supervisory approval. It is frequently up to the individual to seek out alternative courses of action based upon varying interpretations about the possible causes of such punishment.

The issue of perceived intent also seemed relevant to understanding the actions that received mixed ratings. These were supervisor actions that many individuals felt were rewarding, but which were also rated as neutral or even punishing by many other individuals. While earlier research (Hackman & Lawler, 1971; Tornow, 1971) has demonstrated that individual differences in personality and need strength produce differential reactions to the actions reflected in the "Job Demands and Challenge" factor, the mixed valences attached to many of the other actions (e.g., "Supervisory Control and Dominance" or "Negative Reinforcement") also appeared to depend upon situational cues and attributions about intent. Mitchell, Green and Wood (1981) argue that a supervisor goes through a complex attributional process before poor performance is seen as a result of inadequate employee effort and thus should be punished. Many of the mixed rating actions apparently require a similar attributional process.

In other words, the action itself appears somewhat lacking in meaning until such meaning is provided by the situation and the employee (cf. Sims, 1980). Thus, additional duties, assignment to a difficult task that others are unable to perform, or the application of exacting standards might be viewed as a visible acknowledgment of the individual's worth to the organization and a challenge to one's skills. The same actions might also be perceived as an added burden for which there is barely sufficient return to make the effort-outcome ratio equitable. In such a case, the actions are likely to be viewed as neutral. Finally, such actions may be viewed as an unfair application of overly rigid standards, or as indicating low status and a relative lack of worth to the organization. In these instances they are likely to be viewed as punishing.

In summary, the present study was intended to provide increased understanding of the nature of positive versus aversive events by identifying supervisor actions that are generally viewed as rewarding or punishing. Further, the study suggested several characteristics that appear to be associated with the severity of a negative event or the reward value of a positive event. Finally, in the exploration of actions receiving mixed ratings, the study appeared to suggest alternative approaches that should assist future research into the operation of punishment and reward. Certain notes of caution are needed, however. Because the study did not directly address the attribution process or the behavioral implications of the actions studied, explanation involving such issues are largely speculative. Further, while the study was conducted only with employed respondents, these individuals were also college students. Thus some characteristics (e.g., job challenge) may be valued more highly than in other cases.

A similar study (Jones, Butler, & Dutton, Note 1) which asked 58 U.S. Navy enlisted personnel to rate the same actions suggested few differences, however. In fact, the mean ratings were correlated .97 between the two groups. Thus, the reward or punishment values for many of the actions appear consistent across individuals.

In conclusion, the data suggest that employees clearly perceive many supervisor actions as punishing or rewarding. For such actions, it is likely that appropriate influences on behavior are also relatively clear. For many other behaviors, however, it appears that both the intent of the supervisor and the appropriate influences on behavior are less interpretable. Negative connotations may be inadvertently communicated by a supervisor whose intent is neutral or even positive. An explicit statement of the intent for such actions might lead to reinterpretation of the act and to a reassignment of valence (Hammer, 1979). Greater understanding is needed about the contextual cues and individual characteristics that lead to differences in the meaning attached to leader actions especially in regard to the potential impact of inadvertent punishment.

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Footnotes

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¹More than 200 items were generated describing actions that supervisors might take to reward or punish employee behavior. Many of these were eliminated, however, because of redundancy, because they applied to a very narrow spectrum of positions or organizations, because they represented obviously discriminatory or unfair practices, or because the action was ambiguous without an accompanying statement of intent. The resulting set of 60 actions is not exhaustive but does appear representative of supervisor reward and punishment behaviors in a variety of settings.

Table 1
Mean Reward and Punishment Ratings Assigned to Supervisor Actions

I. Supervisor Actions Viewed as Rewarding ^a	Mean ^b		S.D.
1. Recommends a pay raise or promotion.	4.73		.51
2. Gives you more authority and freedom to do the job your own way.	4.59		.62
3. Tells superior about examples of your best work.			
4. Publicly awards plaque or certificate citing your work.	4.54		.62
5. Asks for your opinions.	4.52		.58
6. Makes a point of introducing you to visiting dignitaries.	4.48		.63
7. Lets you participate in deciding what work needs to be done.	4.38		.60
8. Holds you up to coworkers as a good example.	4.38		.70
9. Listens carefully to what you have to say.	4.34		.72
10. Asks you to help train newcomers in your job.	4.32		.69
11. Singles you out as "their apparent" for a prestigious job.	4.32		.83
12. Compliments your actions in public.	4.31		.78
13. Recommends special training that gives you greater job security.	4.24		.68
14. Gives you the most desirable jobs.	4.18		.68
15. Personally explains why he or she made a specific request of you.	4.17		.67
16. Gives you leeway when personal problems interfere with your work.	4.14		.73
17. Allows you to determine what rewards you want to work for.	4.13		.68
18. Compliments your actions in private.	4.11		.68
19. Seeks recognition for you from people outside your group.	4.04		.74
20. Buys you a small gift with his or her own money.	4.04		.78
21. Publicly acknowledges your contributions to his or her own success.	3.94		.97
22. Gives you up to an hour off.	3.89		.75
23. Buys you lunch or coffee.	3.85		.70
24. Gives you a one-time cash award.	3.83		.77
25. Covers for you when you make a mistake.	3.73		.76

Table 1 (Cont.)

II. Supervisor Actions Receiving Mixed Ratings

	<u>Mean</u>	<u>S.D.</u>
26. Gives you the most demanding jobs.	3.73	.87
27. Lets you do what you want when there is no work to do.	3.73	.78
28. Gives you extra time for lunch or coffee breaks.	3.38	.65
29. Looks the other way if you break minor rules.	3.38	.65
30. Praises you to others but not to you directly.	3.36	.82
31. Increases your job responsibilities although there is no increase in pay.	3.10	.94
32. Applies higher standards to your work than are used for anyone else.	2.94	1.09
33. Assigns part of your work to others if you are slow in finishing.	2.71	.77
34. Sets very tight deadlines for you.	2.69	.74
35. Gives you jobs to finish that others won't do.	2.68	.98
36. Gives you an average performance rating.	2.64	.78
37. Gives credit to whole group for what you have done.	2.58	.99
38. Makes you redo your work for minor errors.	2.54	.75
39. Checks on how you are doing your job in a way that is very visible to everyone around you.	2.40	.84
40. Takes away some of your duties.	2.40	.82
41. Refuses to talk to you about anything but your work.	2.33	.69
42. Requires you to do work that is normally done by someone beneath you.	2.29	.64
43. Makes you explain exactly how you would do a job that you have done many times.	2.25	.73
44. Criticizes the whole group when an individual is wrong.	2.22	.80

Table 1 (Cont.)

III. Supervisor Actions Viewed as Punishing^a

	<u>Mean</u>	<u>S.D.</u>
45. Gives you additional work while allowing coworkers to sit idle.	2.01	.86
46. Delays action on your requests until the last minute.	1.92	.69
47. Excludes you from conversations.	1.91	.72
48. Points out rules implying that you need them specially explained.	1.87	.66
49. Watches over your shoulder while you are working.	1.83	.78
50. Tells superiors about your mistakes.	1.83	.76
51. Documents negative things you do.	1.82	.71
52. Withholds training that would give you greater job security.	1.79	.77
53. Takes away special privileges.	1.76	.65
54. Keeps you from doing most satisfying parts of the job.	1.73	.57
55. Withholds information that would make the job easier.	1.65	.66
56. Publicly praises everyone in the group but you.	1.59	.67
57. Criticizes your actions in public.	1.54	.76
58. Makes you do the job over without telling you what you are doing wrong.	1.49	.61
59. Holds you up to coworkers as a poor example.	1.31	.66
60. Fines you or withholds pay.	1.31	.70

NOTE: N = 157

^a More than two-thirds of the respondents rated items in this category as either rewarding or punishing.^b Mean scores reflect a rating scale where 1 = Very Punishing, and 5 = Very Rewarding.

Table 2

Factors Underlying Superior Actions Viewed as Rewarding

Actions	Loadings				h^2
	I	II	III	IV	
1. Personally explains the reasons for a request	<u>.78</u>	.11	.15	.00	.64
2. Listens to what you have to say	<u>.73</u>	.21	.01	.02	.58
3. Allows you to participate in deciding what to do	<u>.65</u>	.16	.10	.13	.48
4. Asks for your opinions	<u>.64</u>	.36	.04	.14	.57
5. Asks you to train newcomers	<u>.52</u>	.15	-.26	.08	.37
6. Allows you to determine rewards	<u>.50</u>	-.15	.25	.34	.46
7. Recommends special training that increases job security	<u>.48</u>	.01	.05	.19	.27
8. Gives you more authority to do job your own way	<u>.42</u>	.04	.36	-.05	.32
9. Introduces you to visiting VIP's	<u>.40</u>	<u>.62</u>	.03	.11	.55
10. Buys you a small gift	-.01	<u>.68</u>	.34	.02	.58
11. Publicly presents a plaque or certificate	.08	<u>.65</u>	-.04	.30	.52
12. Recommends a pay raise	.29	<u>.55</u>	-.09	.16	.42
13. Singles you out as "their apparent" for a prestigious job	.24	<u>.48</u>	-.05	<u>.43</u>	.48
14. Buys you lunch or coffee	-.06	<u>.56</u>	.52	.07	.59
15. Gives you up to an hour off	.06	.00	<u>.65</u>	.15	.45
16. Gives you the most desirable jobs	.21	.24	<u>.62</u>	.18	.52
17. Covers for you when you make a mistake	.08	-.02	<u>.59</u>	.11	.46
18. Presents you with a one-time cash award	-.12	.04	<u>.42</u>	.24	.25

Table 2 (Cont.)

Actions	Loadings				h^2
	I	II	III	IV	
19. Gives you leeway for personal problems	.40	.02	.42	-.09	.34
20. Compliments your actions in public	.04	.19	-.04	.73	.57
21. Seeks recognition from outside groups	.11	.14	.16	.63	.46
22. Holds you up as a good example	.00	.17	.18	.58	.40
23. Acknowledges your contributions to his/her own success	.09	-.01	.11	.49	.27
24. Tells superior about your good work	.27	.33	.09	.40	.33
25. Compliments your work in private	.26	.24	.26	-.13	.21
Eigenvalues	5.67	2.13	1.82	1.34	
Cumulative % of variance before rotation	22.70	31.20	38.50	43.80	
Median rating value for items with loadings > .40	4.34	4.40	3.87	4.32	

Table 3
Factors Underlying Actions Viewed as Punishing

Actions	Loadings				h^2
	I	II	III	IV	
1. Keeps you from doing most satisfying parts of the job	.73	-.17	.05	.16	.59
2. Points out rules implying that you need them explained	.62	.12	.08	.01	.40
3. Makes you do the job over without saying what is wrong	.43	.10	.20	.19	.27
4. Publicly praises everyone but you	.42	.24	.35	.27	.43
5. Takes away privileges	.56	.42	-.01	.21	.53
6. Documents negative actions	.53	.41	.17	-.19	.51
7. Fines you or withholds pay	.14	.75	.00	.09	.59
8. Tells superiors about your mistakes	.35	.70	.12	-.12	.64
9. Gives extra work while others sit idle	-.17	.54	.03	.30	.42
10. Criticizes your actions in public	-.01	.42	.65	.04	.60
11. Watches over your shoulder	.06	-.02	.76	.03	.59
12. Holds you up as a poor example	.35	-.09	.58	.07	.47
13. Withholds information that would make the job easier	-.03	.01	.20	.75	.60
14. Excludes you from conversations	.27	.02	-.29	.63	.55
15. Withholds training that would increase job security	.14	.13	.33	.58	.48
16. Delays actions on your requests until the last minute	.33	.09	-.08	.36	.25
Eigenvalues	3.71	1.53	1.39	1.28	
Cumulative % of variance before rotation	23.20	32.80	41.50	49.50	
Median rating value for items with loadings $> .40$	1.75	1.79	1.54	1.79	

Table 4
Factors Underlying Actions Receiving Mixed Ratings

Actions	Loadings				h^2
	I	II	III	IV	
1. Gives you the most demanding jobs	<u>.66</u>	-.03	-.17	-.08	.48
2. Increases job responsibility without increased pay	<u>.63</u>	-.16	-.10	-.03	.44
3. Gives you jobs to finish that others won't do	<u>.53</u>	.28	-.06	.04	.36
4. Applies higher standards to your work	<u>.48</u>	.10	.10	.00	.25
5. Sets tight deadlines for you	<u>.46</u>	<u>.43</u>	.15	.07	.43
6. Visibly checks on how you are doing your job	<u>.40</u>	.12	.36	-.11	.32
7. Makes you explain jobs you have done before	-.17	<u>.67</u>	-.02	-.09	.49
8. Makes you redo work for minor errors	.05	<u>.67</u>	-.19	-.16	.51
9. Requires you to do work normally done by someone lower	.28	<u>.62</u>	.00	.04	.46
10. Criticises whole group when individual is wrong	.22	<u>.42</u>	.24	.38	.44
11. Gives credit to group for what you have done	.01	-.03	<u>.62</u>	.13	.40
12. Takes away some of your duties	-.42	.14	<u>.54</u>	.10	.50
13. Praises you to others but not directly	.26	-.26	<u>.58</u>	.25	.53
14. Gives you an average performance rating	-.28	.19	<u>.52</u>	-.05	.39
15. Refuses to talk to you except about work	-.01	.00	<u>.44</u>	-.22	.25
16. Looks the other way if you break minor rules	-.18	.04	-.01	<u>.81</u>	.69
17. Lets you do what you want when there is no work	.05	-.19	-.04	<u>.68</u>	.51
18. Gives you extra time for lunch or coffee breaks	.03	.24	-.22	<u>.40</u>	.22
19. Assigns your work to others if you are slow to finish	.20	.23	.14	.23	.16

Table 4 (Cont.)

Eigenvalue before rotation	2.49	2.20	1.75	1.35
Cumulative % of variance before rotation	13.10	24.70	33.90	41.10
Median rating value for items with loadings \geq .40	2.82	2.29	2.58	3.38

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